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A number of recent papers have criticized what they call the dynamical interpretation 
of evolutionary theory found in Elliott Sober’s The Nature of Selection. Sober argues 
that we can think of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces analogous to Newtonian 
mechanics. These critics argue that there are several important disanalogies between 
evolutionary and Newtonian forces: Unlike evolutionary forces, Newtonian forces can 
be considered in isolation, they have source laws, they compose causally in a straight-
forward way, and they are intermediate causes in causal chains. Here we defend and 
extend the forces analogy by arguing that each of these criticisms is based on a misun-
derstanding of Newtonian forces. Our discussion also has the interesting consequence 
that natural selection turns out to be more similar to forces such as friction and elastic 
forces rather than the more canonical gravitation.
1. Introduction
A number of authors, including notably Elliott Sober in The Nature of Selection 
(1984), have argued that the theory of evolution can be usefully understood as a 
theory of forces similar to Newtonian mechanics. Newtonian forces act to alter 
the positions and momenta of material bodies whereas evolutionary forces such as 
natural selection, drift, mutation, and migration act to change gene frequencies in 
populations. We will follow Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002) in referring to this 
conception of evolutionary theory as the dynamical interpretation.1
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1. We will use dynamical interpretation to refer specifically to those that understand natural 
selection, drift, mutation, and migration as forces. As an anonymous referee pointed out, some phi-
losophers conceive of these as causes, while regarding the analogy with Newtonian forces as inapt.
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Recently, several philosophers have criticized the dynamical view, offering in-
stead what they call the statistical interpretation of evolutionary theory. Represen-
tative papers include Walsh (2000); Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002); Matthen 
and Ariew (2002); and Matthen and Ariew (2009). One of the foci of their critique 
has been the analogy between Newtonian and evolutionary forces.
This critique has drawn a number of responses, and the debate has been wide- 
ranging. Nonetheless, we believe that we have a new type of contribution to make. 
Defenders of the statistical interpretation claim that evolutionary theory lacks cer-
tain features essential to a dynamical- forces view and defenders of the dynamical 
view have responded by arguing that evolutionary theory does indeed have these 
features, or at least something sufficiently close to count as appropriately analo-
gous. However, in our view, much of this dialectic rests on false presuppositions 
about what a theory of forces must look like. Newtonian mechanics does not even 
exhibit the features in question. Since Newtonian mechanics is the exemplar of a 
theory of forces, if it lacks the relevant features, then obviously they are not neces-
sary conditions for a dynamical theory of forces.
Examining the analogy between evolutionary theory and Newtonian mechan-
ics is important for a number of reasons. First, it tells us something about the logical 
structure of evolutionary theory (as well as Newtonian mechanics). In particular, it 
tells us about the way in which information about selection, drift, migration, and 
mutation is used to construct a mathematical model describing the evolution of 
gene frequencies in a population. Second, the analogy bears on the causal status of 
evolutionary forces such as natural selection, drift, migration, and mutation. Forc-
es in Newtonian mechanics, such as gravitational forces, electro- magnetic forces, 
friction, and elastic forces are usually taken to be causes of motion. If an argument 
purports to show that natural selection is not a cause of evolutionary change be-
cause it has certain properties, that argument is substantially undermined if, say, 
friction has the same properties. Moreover, Maudlin (2004) argues that causal no-
tions emerge when we have a theory that is “quasi- Newtonian.” The success of the 
analogy between Newtonian mechanics and evolutionary biology bears directly on 
whether the latter has a quasi- Newtonian structure.
Finally, our discussion sheds light on the nature of analogy in science. Tim 
Lewens, a sometime defender of the statistical interpretation of evolutionary the-
ory, writes: “Are drift and selection forces? It is best not to phrase the question as 
bluntly as this. Instead, one should simply ask in what respects drift and selection 
resemble Newtonian forces, and in what ways they differ, paying attention all the 
time to the dangers of a seductive metaphor” (Lewens 2010: 316). We agree. In 
particular, we will argue that both evolutionary forces and Newtonian forces are 
heterogeneous. Thus, to say only that evolutionary forces are analogous to New-
tonian forces is a comparatively uninformative claim. If asked to name a kind of 
force in Newtonian mechanics, most of us would think first of gravitation, and 
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then perhaps of electrostatic forces. We will call these the canonical Newtonian 
forces. We do not mean this term to describe anything about the ontological or 
metaphysical status of these forces. By canonical, we mean only that these are 
likely to be the first forces one would name if asked to give an example of a force 
in Newtonian mechanics. Other kinds of forces, such as those due to friction and 
springs, seem less important, and are less celebrated additions to the Newtonian 
framework. Likewise, one might think of natural selection as the exemplar of an 
evolutionary force, while mutation and migration are likely to be afterthoughts. 
We will argue, however, that gravitation and electrostatic forces are more closely 
analogous to mutation and migration, while natural selection behaves more like 
friction or springs. So there is a sense in which the canonical forces within each 
theory are disanalogous. There is a kind of mismatch in which the paradigmatic 
forces of one theory are matched up with the less heralded forces of the other.
While the debate between the defenders of the dynamical and statistical in-
terpretations of evolutionary biology has been the primary locus of discussion 
of the forces analogy, our concern in the present paper is with the analogy for its 
own sake. We hope to defend, extend, and clarify the analogy. The debate between 
proponents of the dynamical and statistical interpretations extends to issues well 
beyond the aptness of the analogy, and we will not directly address these further is-
sues. Moreover, while we take the upshot of our analysis to be generally favorable 
toward the dynamical interpretation, we are happy if defenders of the statistical 
interpretation wish to adapt some part of our analysis for their own purposes.
One point of terminology: We will use the expression evolutionary forces to 
denote factors like natural selection, drift, mutation, and migration, which defend-
ers of the dynamical view have claimed to be analogous to forces in Newtonian 
mechanics. We do not intend the expression, by itself, to imply that evolutionary 
forces really are forces in something like the sense of Newtonian mechanics. We 
hope, by the end of the paper, to convince the reader that the label is apt, but we 
do not mean to presuppose it from the beginning. Despite the potential to mislead, 
we will mostly avoid using scare quotes, so- called, and other hedging devices when 
talking of evolutionary forces in an effort to enhance legibility.
2. The Dynamical View
Before examining criticisms of the dynamical view, it is important to understand 
exactly what this view is. There is no single dynamical view of evolution any more 
than there is a single statistical view. Different proponents of the dynamical view 
develop their positions in interestingly different ways. Even Sober’s views have 
changed over time. Nonetheless, the central criticisms we examine can all be traced 
back to Sober’s characterization of evolution as a theory of forces (Sober 1984), 
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so we will begin there. Sober (1984) describes one of the goals of a theory of evo-
lution to be a description of the range of possible causes of evolution. Evolution 
here is taken to be a change in the gene frequencies of a population, as is standard, 
though Sober is careful to say that this is merely a rule of thumb and not a hard- 
and- fast principle (Sober 1984: 30). He then says:
All possible causes of evolution may be characterized in terms of their 
“biasing effects.” Selection may transform gene frequencies, but so may 
mutation and migration. And just as each possible evolutionary force may 
be described in terms of its impact on gene frequencies, so it is possible for 
a cause of evolution to be present without producing changes in gene fre-
quencies. . . . All this is to locate evolutionary theory in familiar territory: 
it is a theory of forces. (Sober 1984: 31)
Sober goes on to describe what he means by a theory of forces. He takes such a 
theory to consist of a zero- force law, which says what happens to a system when 
no forces act on it, source laws, which describe the circumstances that produce 
forces, and consequence laws, which describe how forces, once they exist, produce 
changes in the system. These laws should include singleton force models, which say 
what each force achieves when acting alone, as well as compositional laws about 
how to combine forces.
Sober’s own view takes the Hardy- Weinberg Law to be the zero- force law for 
evolutionary theory. This is not essential; Brandon (2006) and McShea and Bran-
don (2010) accept the forces analogy but claim that the appropriate zero- force law 
is the ZFEL (the zero- force evolutionary law), in which an absence of forces leads 
to increased diversity and complexity. Here, rather than engage in this dispute, we 
simply note that there are at least some strong reasons to prefer thinking of drift as 
an agent of change. (Stephens 2010; Barrett et al. 2012). For our expository pur-
poses, we will take the Hardy- Weinberg law to describe the zero- force condition, 
thereby treating drift as a force. Though not universal, this is certainly a standard 
presentation in evolution and population genetics textbooks.
One formulation of the Hardy- Weinberg Law (or principle or model) is as follows:
If a population exists with two alleles, A1 and A2, with frequencies p and q 
respectively, then in a single generation the population will settle into genic 
and genotypic equilibrium with gene frequencies p and q, and genotypic 
frequencies of A1A1 = p2, A1A2 = 2pq, and A2A2 = q2— provided that there 
is no selection, mutation, migration, nonrandom mating, or drift.
A population with these genotype proportions is referred to as being in the Hardy- 
Weinberg equilibrium, and by repeated applications of this law, we can see that, 
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barring the introduction of any evolutionary forces, the population will remain at 
these proportions in evolutionary stasis.
Various kinds of generalizations of the Hardy- Weinberg law are easy to 
derive— for example, what happens when there are more than two alleles at a lo-
cus or when we are interested in genotypes with multiple loci. But the key feature 
is the same: We achieve stasis barring the introduction of any forces. Much of 
population genetics theory deals with asking what happens when we relax various 
assumptions built into this law. For example, the Hardy- Weinberg law assumes 
there is no mutation. But what if there is? Mutation can cause a change in gene 
frequencies in a population and, as such, it is an evolutionary force. As a simple 
example, imagine that the mutation rate from A1 to A2 is µ while the back muta-
tion rate is negligible. Then if we start at the Hardy- Weinberg equilibrium, after 
one generation the frequency of A1 will become p’ = p − µp while q’ = q+ µp. After 
n generations, the frequency of A1 will be pn = p0 × e – µn.2
The Hardy- Weinberg law also assumes that there is no selection. But what 
if there is? No problem. Assign the relative fitnesses of the genotypes as follows: 
A1A1 = w11, A1A2 = w12, A2A2 = w22. Then the genotypes will contribute to the next 
generation in the ratio: p2 × w11 : 2pq × w12 : q2 × w22. To find the actual frequen-
cies, we normalize by dividing each value by the average fitness. Similar simple 
adjustments to the Hardy- Weinberg ratios can be made for various kinds of assor-
tative mating, migration, and drift. But what if there are multiple forces at work? 
Here we need consequence laws, which tell us how to add the results of various 
forces. Luckily, population geneticists are quite clever and they have derived many 
such results— often helpfully contained in chapters with titles such as “Interactions 
of Natural Selection with other Evolutionary Forces” (Templeton 2006) or “Dif-
fusion Theory: Combining Evolutionary Mechanisms” (Rice 2004). Many of these 
results are quite advanced, but some are quite simple. For example, we can com-
bine our results above to find out what will happen to a population under selec-
tion with mutations present. Stephens (2004: 554) uses just such an example from 
Ridley (1996: 115- 116) in order to provide further evidence that we can think of 
evolutionary forces as having magnitudes and directions [with notation variants]:
Ridley . . . describes a simple case where there is genetic variation at a locus 
with two alleles, A and a. Suppose further that there is selection against 
the dominant allele (A), so that the fitnesses of the three genotypes AA, Aa 
and aa are (1 − s), (1 − s) and 1, respectively. Imagine further that muta-
tion opposes selection. Let µ = probability that a mutates into A. What will 
the equilibrium frequency (p*) of A be in this case? Here p* = µ /s. Since 
2. To derive this, think of the generation time as infinitesimally short. Then we can say that in 
each generation, ∆p = dp/dg = - µp. So (1/p)dp = - µ dg. Integrate both sides from p0 to pn and 0 to n 
then solve for pn.
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mutation rates are generally small (typically, µ ≈ 10– 6 or 10– 7), even a mod-
est selection pressure of s = .01 means that the equilibrium frequency of 
A will be very small. Notice the sense in which there is a direction to the 
force of mutation, and notice how (in this case) it opposes selection. We 
can also talk about cases where the force of mutation more or less strongly 
opposes selection, and cases where mutation operates in the same direction 
as selection.
Stephens’s example is a special case of the basic result that in the mutation- selection 
balance the equilibrium frequency of the mutant allele a is q* = µ/[hs + q*s(1 − h)] 
where h is a measure of dominance (so that when h=1, a is dominant as in Ste-
phens’s example). This is usually simplified to q* ≈ µ/hs. For a completely recessive 
allele, h=0 and so q* = √(µ/s).
This result is no mere mathematical curiosity. For example, Morton, Crow, 
and Muller (1956) use these results together with empirical studies of the results 
of inbreeding in humans to estimate the number of lethal, recessive mutations 
we all carry in heterozygote form. From this, they can estimate mutation rates in 
humans. More generally, these results are important to evolutionary theory since 
they help explain the maintenance of genetic variation of all kinds in populations 
through time.
One might object that these results cannot be valid in real, finite populations 
due to random effects that are especially important when such small frequencies 
play an essential role. True enough. Rice (2004) chapter 5 shows how to extend 
this case to include the expected effects of genetic drift. Even for population sizes 
of 10,000 (and especially for smaller effective population sizes) the results are no-
ticeably different from the infinite case. Here, the allele is expected to be missing in 
many populations and above the equilibrium frequency at many others. These re-
sults are also of great theoretical interest. Motoo Kimura (1968) famously posited 
the neutral theory of molecular evolution, in which he argued that the dominant 
factor in molecular evolution was random, neutral mutations that get fixed by ge-
netic drift. In a series of papers, Kimura, Tomoko Ohta, and others generalized this 
to the nearly neutral theory in which many mutations that have slightly deleterious 
(or later, advantageous) effects can also go to fixation (see Ohta and Gillespie 1996 
for a historical overview). These and related results are central to modern evolu-
tionary theory, and they depend essentially on combining the forces of selection, 
mutation, and drift.
In response to Stephens’s example above (and another from Brandon and 
Ramsey 2007), Matthen and Ariew (2009) argue that these results are not relevant 
since these are in no way analogous to the Newtonian paradigm of adding forces 
by vector addition. While it is not clear in what sense (if any) evolutionary forces 
are additive, what matters to Sober’s presentation is that the theory has some way 
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of combining them with consequence laws. This is called the compositional prob-
lem. There is no particular reason to think that we cannot combine forces just 
because we cannot simply add up their effects as if they were independent.
A theory must discover how to combine the forces it describes. . . . Newto-
nian mechanics has made vector addition a familiar paradigm for comput-
ing the net effect of forces acting in concert. But it is only one example, and 
other more complex interactions are certainly possible. . . . Each theory of 
forces must solve this compositional problem for itself, there being no ante-
cedent recipe that is guaranteed to work for all cases. (Sober 1984: 31– 32)
While Sober says that this difference does not undermine the forces analogy, one 
might be tempted to think that this is a deeper problem than Sober admits. We will 
examine the compositional problem and Matthen and Ariew’s arguments about it 
later in the paper.
The above examples should be sufficient to get the gist of what Sober means 
by thinking of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. But is this appropriately 
analogous to Newtonian mechanics?
3. The Statistical View
Beginning around 2000, several philosophers, most prominently André Ariew, Tim 
Lewens, Mohan Matthen, and Denis Walsh, began to develop an alternative pic-
ture of evolutionary theory, which has been labeled the statistical interpretation. 
Defenders of the statistical view maintain that evolutionary forces such as selec-
tion, drift, migration and mutation are not causes of evolutionary change. Matthen 
and Ariew (2002: 56) suggest, in lieu of the analogy with Newtonian forces, an 
analogy with the estimated rate of return on an investment. This estimated rate is 
not a cause of the appreciation of an investment; it is just a prediction of how the 
investment will grow in response to the economic factors (whatever they may be) 
that are genuine causes of growth. Another analogy might be with life expectancy. 
3 Life expectancy is not a cause of longevity; it is simply an estimate of longevity. 
Defenders of the statistical view think that evolutionary forces are more like esti-
mated rate of return or life expectancy than like Newtonian forces.
The debate between proponents of the dynamical interpretation and the statis-
tical interpretation has many moving parts. In the course of the debate, defenders 
of the statistical interpretation have made a number of claims, including:
3. Sober (1984: 95) makes this analogy.
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 1.  The analogy between Newtonian forces and evolutionary “forces” such 
as natural selection, drift, mutation, and migration is misleading. (Walsh 
2000; Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ariew 2002; Matthen 
and Ariew 2009)
 2.  The quantitative parameters that appear in evolutionary models, such as 
fitness coefficients, do not describe causes of evolutionary change, but rath-
er the probabilistic expectation of such change. (Matthen and Ariew 2002: 
56– 57, 67– 68)
 3.  The Hardy- Weinberg law is not a true zero force law. For example, it does 
not apply to asexual reproduction. (Matthen and Ariew 2002; also men-
tioned in Matthen and Ariew 2009 but not defended there)
  4.  It makes no sense to ask what would happen if natural selection were act-
ing “alone.” It is always acting in some kind of material substrate (e.g., 
genetic inheritance via diploid sexual reproduction). (Matthen and Ariew 
2002)
 5.  Evolutionary forces do not obey an additive law, like Newtonian forces. 
(Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ariew 2002; Matthen and 
Ariew 2009)
 6.  It is impossible to look at the change in a population over one or more 
generations and decompose it into the part caused by natural selection, the 
part caused by drift, etc. (Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Matthen and 
Ariew 2002)
  7.  It is a category mistake to call natural selection a “cause” of evolutionary 
change. This reifies natural selection. The causes of evolutionary change 
are things like predation, sunlight, and competition, or variation with re-
spect to cold resistance in a particular population of beetles.4 (Walsh 2000; 
Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ariew 2009)
  8.  Natural selection may be a probabilistic cause in some sense, but it is not 
a causal process in the sense of Salmon (1984) or Dowe (2000). It is not a 
fundamental process. (Walsh 2000; Matthen and Ariew 2002)
  9.  Natural selection is an effect of adaptation (or better, of adaptability) rath-
er than vice versa. (Walsh 2000)
 10.  There is no distinction between evolution and natural selection. (Matthen 
and Ariew 2002)
 11.  Natural selection supervenes upon individual outcomes (e.g., births, 
deaths, matings). (Walsh 2000; Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Matthen 
and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ariew 2009)
4. The allusion is to an example presented by Millstein (2006) and discussed by Matthen and 
Ariew (2009). See below for further discussion of this example.
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 12.  Natural selection is a mathematical truth, rather than an empirical truth. 
(Matthen and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ariew 2009)
 13.  Natural selection is just a statistical aggregate over causal processes at the 
individual level. (Walsh 2000; Matthen and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ar-
iew 2009)
 14.  Natural selection is a statistical artifact, rather than a genuine event, akin 
to the motion of the center of mass of an N particle system when one of 
the particles is accelerated. (Walsh 2000; Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; 
Matthen and Ariew 2009)
 15.  Natural selection is best understood by a hierarchical realization model 
(Matthen and Ariew 2002; Matthen and Ariew 2009)
Some of these claims are intended to provide support for others, but it is not clear 
that one is forced to accept or reject all of these claims together as a suite. They 
are not equivalent. It is not even clear that they are consistent. It is also unclear 
whether any one proponent of the statistical view would accept all of these claims.
The challenge to the dynamical interpretation has sparked a lively and interest-
ing debate. Defenders of the dynamic view have been forced to clarify their posi-
tions in a number of ways, and several distinct variants of the dynamical interpre-
tation have emerged. A number of authors have disputed some of the claims above, 
a small collection of which includes Rosenberg and Bouchard (2005), Abrams 
(2007), and Brandon and Ramsey (2007), who focus on their treatment of fitness, 
selection, and drift; Reisman and Forber (2004), Millstein (2006), and Shapiro 
and Sober (2007), who focus on causation; Stephens (2004), Brandon (2006), and 
Filler (2009), who explicitly defend the forces analogy; and Sober (2011), who ad-
dresses the claim that natural selection is just an analytic truth.
Examining all of these claims in a single article would be impossible. Our 
focus in the present paper is claim (1), which challenges the analogy between evo-
lutionary and Newtonian forces. We construe (2) through (6) as claims intended 
to undermine the analogy and will examine them in greater detail as well. We will 
largely be defending the analogy, so our analysis is likely to be favorable to the 
dynamical interpretation. However, it is not our intention to defend the dynamical 
interpretation in whole. If defenders of the statistical interpretation wish to use 
some aspect of our analysis to defend some part of their position, we invite them to 
do so. (We will mention one such possibility in the next section.) Our goal is only 
to clarify the analogy; we will leave it to the proponents of the two interpretations 
to elaborate on the role of the clarified analogy in the larger dialectic.
Defenders of the statistical interpretation have focused primarily on natural 
selection and genetic drift, saying relatively little about other evolutionary forces 
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such as migration and mutation. While we will discuss natural selection at some 
length, we have relatively little to say about drift. Drift is the evolutionary force 
that looks least like a Newtonian force to us. By contrast, we will argue that the 
analogy is particularly strong for migration and mutation. In this respect, the ver-
sion of the analogy that we will defend is not perfectly aligned with the version 
that defenders of the statistical view have attacked. Perhaps then, this part of our 
analysis will do little harm to the statistical position. That is fine with us, since our 
primary concern is with clarifying the analogy.
We will focus our discussion on the two papers by Matthen and Ariew (2002; 
2009). Matthen and Ariew are more explicit than any of the authors on either side 
of the debate in what they take a theory of forces to require. They also examine 
the analogy with Newtonian forces more closely than anyone else. It has now been 
more than a decade since the publication of Matthen and Ariew (2002), and nu-
merous publications have appeared on both sides of the debate (of which we have 
mentioned only a few). To our knowledge, no one on either side of the debate has 
challenged the picture of Newtonian forces that is painted by Matthen and Ariew. 
In doing so ourselves, we thus take ourselves to be challenging presuppositions 
that have been at least tacitly accepted by both sides of the debate.
4. Analogies
Mary Hesse (1966) provides a familiar framework for thinking about analogies in 
science. An analogy involves a target system, which we are trying to understand, 
and a model system. In our present topic, the target system is evolutionary biology, 
and the model system is Newtonian mechanics. In any such analogy, there is a posi-
tive analogy, negative analogy, and neutral analogy. The positive analogy involves 
those features of the two systems that are known to be analogous. The negative 
analogy involves those features that are known to be disanalogous. The neutral 
analogy involves those features where it is not known whether they are analogous 
or not. The neutral analogy is thus the domain in which we hope to acquire new 
knowledge of the target system by extending the analogy.
As Stephens (2004) notes, the analogy between evolutionary theory and New-
tonian mechanics was never intended to be perfect. And there are important points 
of disanalogy. For one example, there is no evolutionary analogue of Newton’s 
third law. Consider the case discussed by Millstein (2006) involving populations of 
montane willow leaf beetles in different parts of California. The relative prevalence 
of the PGI- 1 and PGI- 4 alleles varies across these populations. The research of 
Rank and Dalhoff (2002) suggests that beetles that are homozygous for the PGI- 1 
allele have greater resistance to cold temperatures than those that are homozygous 
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for the PGI- 4 allele (with heterozygotes having an intermediate level of resistance). 
If the cold climate creates a selection pressure favoring the PGI- 1 allele in a popula-
tion of beetles, the beetles do not exert any opposing force on the climate.5
A more important disanalogy results from the stochastic nature of evolution-
ary change. Evolutionary forces can determine the expected representation of al-
leles or phenotypic traits in the next generation, but there will be chance deviations 
from this expected value due to sampling error. There is no obvious analogue of 
this in Newtonian mechanics. Brownian motion is perhaps the closest analogue.6 
7 One certainly can combine deterministic forces with Brownian motion. For in-
stance, particles suspended in a fluid might be subject to gravity and Brownian mo-
tion, and we can combine these to predict the vertical distribution of particles. But 
Brownian motion does not result from sampling error and is not dependent on the 
size of a population. For this reason, we think that there are important conceptual 
issues concerning the role of chance, the status of drift, and how to combine drift 
with other evolutionary forces, for which the analogy with Newtonian mechanics 
provides no clear guidance.
Let us now consider potential points of positive analogy between evolutionary 
forces and Newtonian forces. There are (at least) two different ways in which they 
may be analogous:
 1.  Evolutionary forces are like Newtonian forces in the way that they are used 
to construct mathematical models of the evolution of a system in time.
 2.  Evolutionary forces are like Newtonian forces in being causes of the tempo-
ral evolution of the system.
Claim 2 is the primary source of disagreement between defenders of the dynamical 
and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. Claim 1 is, in a certain sense, 
easier to assess. That is because it can be evaluated by examining the practice of 
evolutionary biology and Newtonian mechanics, without having to unearth the 
metaphysical commitments that underlie the practice. This makes possible an argu-
ment from analogy that nicely fits Hesse’s framework. A defender of the dynamical 
interpretation could first establish 1, thus establishing a positive analogy between 
5. On the other hand, as several commentators have pointed out, the climate does create a selec-
tive pressure against the PGI- 4 allele. More generally, any selective pressure for some trait must be a 
selective pressure against one or more alternatives.
6. As Kenny Easwaran and others have pointed out to us, friction and elastic forces, which we 
discuss in some detail below, actually emerge from the aggregate statistical behavior of more elemen-
tary forces in certain kinds of system. However, in macroscopic physical systems, the numbers are so 
great that no substantial deviation from the expected value can be anticipated.
7. Charles Pence (2012) examines the analogy between drift and Brownian motion and its im-
plications for the forces debate.
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evolutionary and Newtonian forces. 2 would remain part of the neutral analogy. 
Then, one could argue for extending the positive analogy from 1 to 2. Like any 
argument from analogy, this argument would be highly defeasible and could be 
undermined by a more careful examination of the metaphysical commitments of 
evolutionary theory. While no author has framed the argument in quite this form, 
we take this kind of argument to be implicit in the work of many defenders of the 
dynamical view. For example, Rice (2004: 130– 131) treats selection and mutation 
as population level directional processes. Then, he says, “[w]e can thus represent 
their effects in terms of vector fields over the space of allele frequencies. . . . Com-
bining these processes becomes easy, in that, for any value of p we can simply add 
together the two vector fields to get the joint effects of the two processes. In this 
sense, selection and mutation behave like forces in physics.”
In response, it is open to the defender of the statistical interpretation to chal-
lenge 1. Of the four specific arguments from Matthen and Ariew (2002; 2009) that 
we discuss below, three strike us as being directed primarily against 1. The fourth 
(the tertium quid argument) seems to directly challenge 2.
Before examining these arguments, we wish to briefly mention a possible strat-
egy for blocking the inference from 1 to 2 that has not been explored.8 Defenders 
of the statistical view have assumed that component forces in Newtonian mechan-
ics are causes of motion,9 and we will follow suit. 10 But there are a number of 
subtle and interesting issues about how to apportion causal responsibility among 
component forces, the sources of such forces, and resultant (or net) forces in New-
tonian mechanics.11 It is possible that there is a defensible view about the causal 
status of Newtonian forces that a defender of the statistical interpretation would 
find to be an attractive analogue. In this case, the analogy between evolutionary 
and Newtonian forces may even bolster the statistical interpretation. While we 
will not explore this possibility here, our arguments will not foreclose this pos-
8. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for prompting this discussion.
9. For one example, Matthen and Ariew (2002: 59) write that “component forces act indepen-
dently of one another. . . . This independence condition for component causation, which we regard 
as indispensable to the Newtonian apparatus of resolved force, fails in the evolutionary case. . . . [I]f 
Sober’s conception of evolutionary fitness is right . . . the . . . causes of evolution [should] add up to 
a resultant force. If the analogy with Newtonian mechanics is to be maintained, these components 
should, despite such summation, retain their separate causal influences.”
10. More precisely, we will assume that a force acting on a body during the open time interval 
(t, t’) is a cause of its position and velocity at time t’ and later. It is more problematic to say that a 
force acting at time t is a cause of the instantaneous acceleration at t (as related in Newton’s second 
law). We remain neutral toward that claim.
11. See for example Jammer (1957), Creary (1981), Cartwright (1983: Chapter 3), Forster 
(1988), and Wilson (2007; 2009).
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sibility.12 Indeed, a careful examination of the analogy between evolutionary and 
Newtonian forces of the sort we hope to provide would be a necessary precursor 
to developing such an argument.
While conflating a negative analogy with a positive analogy is one kind of error, 
there is another kind of error whose possibility is less immediately apparent. When 
the target and model systems have complex structures, as do Newtonian mechan-
ics and evolutionary theory, it is not always enough to say which parts of each sys-
tem belong to the positive analogy. For this can still leave it undetermined which 
elements of the target system are analogous to which elements of the model system. 
For example, even if we grant that evolutionary forces are analogous to forces in 
Newtonian mechanics, it may turn out that a particular evolutionary force, such as 
natural selection, is more closely analogous to some specific Newtonian force than 
to others. We will argue that this is in fact the case and that the internal structure 
of the analogy is a little surprising. If one were asked to name forces in Newtonian 
mechanics, one would almost certainly start with gravity. Second would probably 
be electromagnetic forces, such as the force of electrostatic attraction described in 
Coulomb’s law. Call these the canonical Newtonian forces. Forces such as friction 
and elastic forces would come further down the list. Similarly, if asked to name 
evolutionary forces, natural selection would almost certainly spring to mind first. 
It is the canonical evolutionary force. Genetic drift would likely come second. 
Mutation and migration are likely to enter the list only as afterthoughts. We will 
argue that natural selection is most closely analogous to non- canonical Newto-
nian forces such as elastic forces, while mutation and migration are more closely 
analogous to the canonical Newtonian forces such as gravitation. Drift, as we 
mentioned above, seems closer to Brownian motion than to any force. Thus the 
analogy between forces in evolutionary theory and Newtonian mechanics exhibits 
a kind of mismatch, where the canonical forces of one theory are not matched up 
with the canonical forces of the other. (This is shown schematically in figure 1.)
It is possible that this mismatch may serve some of the needs of defenders 
of the statistical interpretation of evolutionary theory. For example, in physics, 
gravity, electromagnetism, and the weak and strong nuclear forces are considered 
fundamental forces; friction and elastic forces are not. These forces arise on the ag-
gregate level from the action of the fundamental forces (especially electromagnetic 
forces). The situation is a bit tricky, since the details of how these forces arise are 
not completely understood. Moreover, the explanation will likely take us out of 
the realm of Newtonian mechanics. It will certainly take us beyond the mechanics 
taught in a first year university physics course, which is what we take to be the 
12. Except to the extent that our discussion of the tertium quid argument precludes certain 
views about Newtonian forces.
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intended model system for purposes of the analogy with evolutionary biology. So it 
may be fair to say that from the perspective of elementary Newtonian mechanics, 
friction and spring forces are basic. But let us put these concerns aside. It would 
seem that an analogy between natural selection and these non- fundamental forces 
would provide support for claim 11 above, namely, that natural selection super-
venes on the births, deaths, and matings of individual organisms.
It is not clear to us that much mileage can be gotten from this claim (which 
some proponents of the dynamical interpretation, such as Shapiro and Sober, 
2007, accept). One can imagine an argument, perhaps similar to Kim’s (1998) well- 
known argument for the causal inefficacy of mental properties (if non- reductive 
materialism is true), that supervenient forces such as friction and natural selection 
are not causes.13 But we do not interpret defenders of the statistical interpreta-
tion of evolutionary biology to be making any kind of argument that extends to 
macro- causation generally. Their arguments are specific to evolutionary biology, 
and hinge on the details of that theory. Moreover, defenders of the statistical inter-
pretation seem happy to talk about certain macro- level causes, such as causes of 
13. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.
Figure 1. The analogy between evolutionary and Newtonian forces. The more 
canonical evolutionary forces are most closely analogous to less canonical 
Newtonian forces, and vice versa.
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changes in specific populations.14 But we are open to the possibility that defenders 
of the statistical interpretation may exploit the analogy between natural selection 
and non- fundamental forces in Newtonian mechanics to their advantage.
5. Criticisms of the Forces Analogy
We identify four primary arguments offered by Matthen and Ariew (2002; 2009) 
to claim that natural selection, drift, mutation, migration, and so on are not analo-
gous to Newtonian forces.
 1.  Isolability. In Newtonian mechanics, it makes perfect sense to ask what 
would happen if a single force were to act on a lone body in isolation. For 
instance, we can calculate the motion of a body that is subject to a gravi-
tational force, even if it is otherwise in a complete vacuum. By contrast, it 
makes no sense to ask what would happen if natural selection were act-
ing in isolation. Natural selection can only act in some physical “substrate” 
(Matthen and Ariew 2002: 68). Such a substrate will include such things 
as an organism’s means of reproduction, the mechanisms of inheritance, 
and so on. For example, heterosis (when heterozygotes have higher fitness 
than either homozygote) can only take place in sexually reproducing diploid 
populations. Even Sober’s (1984) candidate for a zero- force law, the Hardy- 
Weinberg law, only holds for sexually reproducing diploid populations. This 
substrate is not just another force whose effect can be independently added.
 2.  Source laws. There are “source laws” for forces, such as Coulomb’s laws, 
and the law of universal gravitation. These laws provide independent values 
for component forces. Thus, forces have empirical content beyond what they 
imply about the acceleration of the body that is acted on (in accordance 
with the second law). By contrast, the parameters that appear in evolution-
ary theory, such as fitness coefficients, can only be interpreted in terms of 
the response of the population. A fitness coefficient represents the expected 
number of offspring of organisms of a particular type (usually in compari-
son with other organisms in the population). There are no source laws that 
tell you, e.g., that whenever an organism has trait X in environment Y, its 
fitness will be w.
 3.  Composition of forces. Newtonian forces combine according to a simple ad-
dition law. To determine the effect of two forces acting together, we can first 
determine the effect of each force acting alone (which is possible by 2) and 
14. For example, Matthen and Ariew (2009: 203) endorse the claim that variation with respect 
to camouflage in certain moth populations has caused changes in those populations.
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add the effects together. This allows us to determine how much of a body’s 
motion is due to one force, and how much is due to another. There is no 
general rule for how evolutionary “forces” combine. For example, consider 
an organism that “undertakes parental care, is resistant to malaria, and is 
somewhat weak but very quick” (Matthen and Ariew 2002: 67). There is no 
rule for combining these fitness- affecting traits to arrive at a fitness value for 
the organism.
 4.  Tertium quid. Newtonian forces are a tertium quid. They are causes that ap-
pear in a causal chain: A source (such as a massive body) produces a force, 
which in turn causes motion. These three things are all distinct. By contrast, 
natural selection is not a tertium quid. It does not exist independently of the 
traits of organisms in a population, and individual events of birth, death, 
reproduction, etc.
We will argue that all four of these alleged disanalogies rest on misconceptions 
about Newtonian forces.
Isolability
We agree that evolutionary forces can only act in some kind of physical substrate. 
By contrast, one massive body can exert a gravitational force on another even in 
the absence of other forces.15 However, it is not true that all Newtonian forces are 
capable of acting in the absence of other forces. Consider electrostatic forces. It is 
material bodies that have charges and these material bodies will also have mass 
and thus exert a gravitational force. If one body exerts an electrostatic force on 
another, it must also exert a gravitational force on that same body and thus it is 
impossible for electrostatic forces to act in isolation.
Of course this “impossibility” result depends on the fact that all bodies that 
have charge also have mass. Perhaps we do not want to build this in to Newtonian 
mechanics as a conceptual fact. It is at least conceivable that there are massless 
bodies that do have charges and it is unclear that Newtonian physics rules this out.
But consider the case of friction. Suppose a block is resting on an inclined sur-
face. (See figure 2.) A gravitational force, Fg, pulls straight down on the block. The 
surface pushes back against the block with a force that is normal to the surface, Fn. 
When added together, these two forces will yield a force that pulls the block down 
the inclined slope. The force of friction Ff will oppose this force, impeding the 
block’s motion down the slope, with a maximum magnitude equal to μFn, where μ 
15. Not counting the equal and opposite force that the second body exerts on the first. We have 
already granted that Newton’s third law is not directly analogous to anything in evolutionary theory.
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is the coefficient of friction between the block and plane.16 The only law in Newto-
nian mechanics that tells us how friction works tells us that there is a force due to 
friction exactly when there is a normal force acting on the body (and, if the body 
is not already in motion, some force tending to move the body along the surface). 
Thus friction forces never operate alone: they always require at least a normal 
force to be present. This undermines the claim of Matthen and Ariew that New-
tonian forces (unlike evolutionary forces) can always be considered in isolation.
There is another sense in which Newtonian forces require a substrate. In New-
tonian mechanics, all forces operate against a substrate of space and time. For 
Newton, this was simply Euclidean absolute space plus absolute time. But we know 
now that there are other possibilities. Newton’s first law can be understood as tell-
ing us that when no forces act on a body, it follows a geodesic (either of space, or 
of the underlying space- time). In a non- Euclidean geometry, for example, two par-
ticles can be traveling in parallel, with identical uniform velocities, and nonetheless 
approach and recede from one another. This is due to the metrical structure of the 
space, and not due to any forces acting on the bodies. In general relativity, a body 
16. The story is a bit more complicated. There are separate coefficients for static friction, which 
must be overcome in order for the block to start moving, and kinetic friction, which applies once the 
block is sliding down the surface. The coefficient of static friction is generally larger.
Figure 2. The force of friction opposes the motion of a block along an inclined 
surface.
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with no forces acting on it follows a geodesic in a four- dimensional space- time 
whose metric has a Lorentzian signature. In this framework, the earth undergoes 
uniform motion in its orbit about the sun. Any force that acts on a body will then 
cause it to deviate from the geodesic. Indeed, the notion of acceleration only makes 
sense in the context of a space- time with a certain amount of metrical structure.
As Poincaré and Reichenbach have taught us, it is sometimes possible to ab-
sorb forces into the space- time structure, or to pull them out of it. For example, in 
Newtonian mechanics, gravity is a force. But it is possible to formulate an empiri-
cally equivalent physical theory in which gravity is incorporated into the space- 
time structure, much as it is in general relativity.
Newtonian physics (at least in its standard formulation) also requires a refer-
ence frame. Normally the laws of Newtonian mechanics are taken to describe the 
behavior of bodies in an inertial reference frame. But it is sometimes convenient 
to use different reference frames, and these can give rise to fictitious forces. For in-
stance, in the coordinate frame of a rotating disk, there will be centrifugal “forces” 
pulling bodies toward the edge of the disk. In actuality, these forces result from 
the tendency of bodies to continue moving in straight lines (which appear to be 
accelerated trajectories in the rotating frame). On the surface of a rotating sphere 
(such as the earth), there will be Coriolis forces, and so on.
We suspect that in evolutionary biology, there may be similar cases where there 
is some flexibility as to whether something is treated as a force, or whether it is 
incorporated into the substrate in which other forces act. For example, Sober states 
directly that the typical way of presenting evolutionary theory takes evolution to 
occur with the background of the Mendelian inheritance system. This means that 
various kinds of genotypic features of a population (like the percentage of hetero-
zygotes) can change due to the Mendelian process, but evolutionary theory does 
not record this change as the results of any forces. On the other hand, features such 
as genetic linkage are treated as forces. Sober explicitly compares this to gravita-
tion in general relativity (Sober 1984: 35– 36).
Brandon (2006) and McShea and Brandon (2010) argue that genetic drift is 
not a force, and that its operation should be incorporated into the zero- force law. 
In effect, they claim that drift is kinematic (like inertia) rather than dynamic (like 
the response to a genuine force). We suspect that this is a case where there is some 
flexibility about whether to treat drift as a force, or to incorporate it into the op-
eration of the substrate.17
17. Indeed, McShea and Brandon (2010) suggest that it is a matter of convention how causes 
are partitioned into forces. Maudlin (2004) suggests something similar. Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for pointing this out.
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Source Laws
In Newtonian mechanics, there are (at least) two different kinds of laws in which 
forces appear. (We put aside Newton’s third law, which does not have an obvious 
evolutionary analogue.) First, there are source laws, which specify the conditions 
under which certain kinds of component forces act on a body. Canonical examples 
include Newton’s universal law of gravitation and Coulomb’s law of electrostatic 
forces. Newton’s law tells us that if we have two massive bodies with masses m1 
and m2, separated by distance r, the force of gravity acting on each body is Fg = 
Gm1m2/r2, directed inward along the line connecting the two bodies. (This assumes 
that the bodies are small compared to the distance between them.) G is the gravita-
tional constant. Coulomb’s law tells us that if we have two bodies with charges q1 
and q2, separated by distance r, the electrostatic force acting on each body is Fe = 
keq1q2/r2, where ke is Coulomb’s constant, and the force is directed outward along 
the line connecting the two bodies (resulting in an inward or attractive force when 
q1q2 is negative). Second, there is the consequence law, Newton’s second law, which 
tells us that Fnet = ma, where Fnet is the net force acting on a body, m is the body’s 
mass, and a is the body’s (instantaneous) acceleration. This tells us how a body will 
move in response to all of the forces acting on it.
Source laws give us a means of calculating component forces that is indepen-
dent of the resulting acceleration. For example, if we wish to model the trajectory 
of a comet, we can calculate the sun’s gravitational force on the comet; we do not 
need to observe the comet’s acceleration and put the gravitational force in “by 
hand.” Similarly, if a body is affected by more than one force (say a gravitational 
force and an electrostatic force), we can calculate the separate component forces, 
even though the acceleration can only tell us about the value of the net force. Even 
if the forces acting on a body add up to zero, so that the body does not accelerate 
at all, we can use the source laws to calculate the individual component forces act-
ing on the body.
It is natural to assume that this independent means of epistemic access to New-
tonian forces gives us some reason to think that they are real, and that they are 
distinct from the accelerations that they produce. Both of these conditions are pre-
requisites for Newtonian forces to be causes of the motions of bodies.18 If evolu-
tionary forces do not have source laws providing analogously independent means 
of epistemic access, this would be an important disanalogy that would bear on the 
causal status of evolutionary forces.
18. We would like to thank Sam Baron for pressing us on the connection between source laws 
and causation.
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According to Matthen and Ariew, the closest analogues that evolutionary 
theory provides to the source laws of Newtonian mechanics are qualitative and 
comparative claims about the reproductive advantages of various traits. General 
ecological considerations might tell us, for example, that speed would be a benefi-
cial trait in a prey species inhabiting open grasslands; physiology might tell us that 
anemia would be detrimental; malaria resistance would be beneficial in habitats 
where malaria is endemic, but would be of little use to a species that lived in the 
arctic; and so on. But these considerations do not provide the quantitative fitness 
coefficients that figure in population genetics models. The only way to determine 
fitness coefficients is to observe the actual number of offspring of different organ-
isms. Matthen and Ariew write that
the quantification of fitness in the laws of population genetics is conceptu-
ally independent of their occurrence in source laws in a way not paralleled 
in the Newtonian treatment of force. The overall fitness values demanded 
by consequence laws [of population genetics] must be estimated statisti-
cally, that is, by looking at actual values for number of offspring, and using 
these actual values to estimate expected values and other statistical quanti-
ties. (Matthen and Ariew 2002: 67)
Matthen and Ariew infer from this that fitness coefficients are not quantitative 
measures of causes of evolutionary change but only estimates of the resulting 
change.
A more careful examination of both Newtonian mechanics and evolution, 
however, reveals that both theories include a heterogeneous assortment of forces. 
Some Newtonian forces conform more closely to Matthen and Ariew’s character-
ization of evolutionary forces, and vice versa.
Gravitational forces and electrostatic forces have source laws essentially as 
Matthen and Ariew describe. In particular, they have source laws with the follow-
ing two characteristics:
  (i)  The source laws tell us when these forces will be present. Newton’s law of 
universal gravitation tells that a gravitational force will act on a massive 
body whenever one or more further massive bodies are present. Coulomb’s 
law tells us that an electrostatic force will act on a charged body whenever 
one or more further charges are present.
 (ii)  These source laws tell us how to compute the magnitude and direction 
of the component forces, in terms of the properties of the sources (their 
masses and distances, in the case of gravity, or their charges and distances, 
in the case of electrostatics). The magnitude and direction of these compo-
nent forces can be calculated without performing any measurements on the 
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system under investigation. The values of the gravitational and Coulomb 
constants must be determined empirically (a point made by Brandon and 
Ramsey 2007), but once they have been determined with a desired degree 
of precision, the corresponding laws can be applied to new systems with-
out the need for further measurements on those systems.
To Matthen and Ariew, this indicates that gravitational and electrostatic forces 
have a reality that is distinct from the accelerations that they ultimately produce. 
These forces are not just measures of a system’s expected response to the presence 
of masses or charges.
But not all forces in Newtonian mechanics are like this. Consider friction. It 
has feature (i) described above, but only partially has feature (ii). Recall our ex-
ample of a block on an inclined surface. (Figure 2.) The source law for friction tells 
us that the force of friction Ff will oppose the block’s motion down the slope, with 
a maximum magnitude equal to μFn, where μ is the coefficient of friction between 
the block and the plane. Here the source law tells us when there will be a force 
due to friction— when there is a force normal to the surface and either a tangential 
force or motion due to inertia. And it gives us a formula to compute the size of the 
force. But nothing in Newtonian mechanics tells us what the coefficient of friction 
will be. This will depend upon the microstructure of the two surfaces, and has to be 
discovered empirically, through measurements of this very system or other systems 
involving blocks and surfaces of similar composition.
Now consider the linear restoring force of a spring. Suppose that a spring with 
a mass attached is stretched beyond its normal relaxation point. (See figure 3.) If it 
stretches by distance x, there will be a restoring force, described by Hooke’s law: 
Fr = - kx, where k is a spring constant specific to this particular spring. This source 
law does not have either feature (i) or (ii) described above. It does not have feature 
(i) because nothing in Newtonian mechanics tells us when something behaves as a 
“spring,” aside from Hooke’s law itself. That is, nothing in the theory tells us what 
kinds of objects obey Hooke’s law. We know that well- made springs obey Hooke’s 
law, to a good approximation, within a limited range. But it is only through ex-
perimentation that we can discover, e.g., that a bungee cord approximately obeys 
Hooke’s law, while the string of cheese that connects your teeth to a pizza slice 
after you bite it does not. We could define a “spring” to be anything that obeys 
Hooke’s law, but as a criterion for the application of Hooke’s law, this is obviously 
circular. Hooke’s law also lacks feature (ii), since nothing in Newtonian mechanics 
tells us what the value of k will be. This is a particular property of any given spring, 
and it can only be determined by observing the spring in question, or other springs 
of similar construction.
The situation in evolutionary theory is similar. Matthen and Ariew are cor-
rect that natural selection lacks features (i) and (ii). Considerations from ecology, 
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physiology, and so on, may give us grounds for thinking that certain traits will be 
beneficial or detrimental to members of a certain population, but the theory of 
evolution does not give any definite account of when fitness differences will occur. 
Nor does it provide formulae for calculating fitness coefficients. The fitnesses of 
different types of organism in a population typically have to be estimated from ob-
served rates of reproductive success in a population. In this respect, fitness coeffi-
cients are like coefficients of friction or spring constants in Newtonian mechanics.
Other evolutionary forces, such as migration and mutation, do have source 
laws with features (i) and (ii). Migration occurs when individuals immigrate into 
or emigrate out of a population. One can independently determine how many (and 
sometimes even which types of) individuals are entering or leaving a population to 
determine the appropriate parameters to plug into a population genetics model. In 
a standard model, we assume that migrants are random members of the relevant 
population. Thus if p1 is the initial frequency of A in population 1, p2 the frequency 
in population 2, and m12 the proportion of population 1 recently arrived from 
population 2 (called the migration rate), then the frequency of A in population 1 
in the next generation will be p’ = (1 − m12) p1 + m12 p2. These parameters do not 
have to be estimated by observing the response of the population to migration. 
Figure 3. The restoring force in a stretched spring.
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They directly represent these rates of migration, and their numerical values have 
a clear interpretation that is independent of the expected response of the popula-
tion. Similarly, mutation rates represent the rates at which mutations occur during 
meiosis. These can be measured independently of the effects of such mutations on a 
population and have a clear meaning that is independent of the expected response 
of the population to mutation pressure.
Composition of Forces
In Newtonian mechanics, forces compose according to the familiar vector addition 
rule. Suppose that two forces, F1 and F2, are acting on a body at a specific time t. 
(See figure 4.) Then the total force acting on the body at t, Fnet, will be the vector 
sum of the component forces— the result of aligning the vectors ‘tip to tail’. Work-
ing in reverse, we can decompose the total force into the two component forces, 
and specify the contribution of each component force to the total force. Moreover, 
a component force makes the same contribution to the total force regardless of 
which other component forces are present. There are no interaction effects among 
Newtonian forces.
Matthen and Ariew describe the composition of forces this way:
[T]he mathematical device of “resolving” forces by vector addition does 
not compromise the separate operation of “component” forces like gravi-
tation and drag. . . . It makes no difference . . . whether we first combine 
forces by vector addition and then use Newton’s second law to derive ac-
celeration, or, reversing the order of these operations, first feed the compo-
Figure 4. The vector addition rule for forces.
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nent forces into the second law one by one and then use vector addition 
to combine the separate acceleration vectors that result. . . . Physically, the 
component forces act independently of one another; there is no mechanism 
that creates a new force out of them.
This indispensable condition for component causation, which we regard 
as indispensable to the Newtonian apparatus of resolved force, fails in the 
evolutionary case. (Matthen and Ariew 2002: 59)
This passage contains a subtle transition that deserves closer examination. New-
ton’s second law, Fnet = ma, relates the total force acting on a body at a given time 
t with the acceleration of the body at the very same instant of time t. Similarly, the 
vector addition law relates component forces with total forces at the same instant 
of time. What Matthen and Ariew say about the order of operations is quite cor-
rect. In figure 3, we could sum F1 and F2 to arrive at Fnet and then use Newton’s 
second law to calculate the simultaneous acceleration of the body a. Or, we could 
apply Newton’s second law to F1 and F2 to arrive at simultaneous component accel-
erations a1 and a2 and then add these together to arrive at the same simultaneous 
acceleration a.
It is highly misleading, however, to describe this as “component causation.” 
Newton’s second law relates simultaneous values of force and acceleration, and it 
is highly problematic to describe the force Fnet as a cause of the simultaneous accel-
eration a. We will address this issue in greater detail in the next section. This is not 
to deny that forces cause motions. We take it as unproblematic that the force act-
ing on a body over an interval of time (t0, t1) is a cause of the body’s position and 
velocity (inter alia) at times t ≥ t1. But this kind of causal relation is not governed 
by anything like a vector addition law. Smith (2010) explains this point in detail. 
We will give a simple illustration.
Suppose that a small test particle p (perhaps a piece of debris from a comet) is 
affected by the gravitational force from two massive bodies m1 and m2 (perhaps 
comprising a binary star system). At time t = 0, the three bodies have initial veloci-
ties vp, v1, and v2, respectively. (See figure 5.)
Suppose, first, that only m1 had been present. (See figure 6.) After a certain 
amount of time, t = T, m1 would have moved. p also would have moved. Due to 
the gravitational force of m1, the trajectory tp of p would be deflected from the 
trajectory tv that it would have followed if it had continued traveling with uniform 
velocity v. The displacement vector dp may be thought of as measuring the effect of 
m1’s gravitational attraction on the trajectory of p. Based on the new positions of 
both p and m1, p will be subject to a gravitational force F1 at time t = T.
Now, let us return to the case where both m1 and m2 are present (figure 7). 
Because of the gravitational influence of m2, both m1 and p will occupy different 
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positions after the same amount of elapsed time. As a result, the component force 
due to m1 will be different from what it was at the same time in the previous case. 
This will be the case for every point in the particle’s trajectory tpԢ, except for the 
starting position at t = 0. Exactly analogous points apply, mutatis mutandis, to the 
gravitational force due to m2.
When both m1 and m2 are present, then at every point in the particle’s trajec-
tory, the component force F1Ԣ due to m1 is different from what it would have been if 
only m1 had been present, and the component force F2Ԣ due to m2 is different from 
what it would have been if only m2 had been present. Thus there is absolutely no 
reason to think that the total displacement dpԢ that would result would simply be 
Figure 5. A test particle in the vicinity of two massive bodies.
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Figure 6. The trajectory of the particle and the gravitational force acting on the 
particle if only one of the bodies were present.
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Figure 7. The trajectory of the particle and the gravitational force acting on the 
particle, with both bodies present.
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the sum of the displacement that would have occurred if only m1 had been present, 
and the displacement that would have occurred if only m2 had been present. There 
is no simple additive law for the effects of forces.
Similarly, there is no simple decomposition of the displacement dpԢ into parts 
caused by the gravitational attraction of each mass. At time t = T, and at any other 
time in the trajectory of p, we can decompose the total force acting on p into the 
two component forces: one due to m1, and one due to m2. We can even decompose 
the displacement dpԢ into parts due to the instantaneous component forces from 
m1, and the instantaneous component forces from m2. But this will not in any 
meaningful way be a decomposition of the displacement into parts caused by the 
gravitational forces of m1 and m2. That is because the instantaneous component 
force due to m1 at a given time T depends on the positions of p and m1, and these 
have in turn been influenced by the gravitational effects of m2 on both m1 and p, 
and vice versa. Each component force reflects the earlier gravitational effects of 
both masses.
The punch line is that insofar as Newtonian forces obey a vector addition law 
(namely with respect to instantaneous forces and acceleration), they are not un-
problematically conceived as causes; and insofar as forces are unproblematically 
conceived as causes (of later positions and velocities) they do not obey a vector ad-
dition law. This ought to make us suspicious of the claim that the vector addition 
law is central to the status of Newtonian forces as causes.
Now let us consider the case of evolutionary forces. We saw the earlier ex-
ample in which selection and mutation combine in something like an additive 
way. Brandon and Ramsey (2007) argue that evolutionary forces often do combine 
additively. For example, they claim that we can find the resulting change in gene 
frequencies in a population due to selection, mutation and migration by simply 
adding them up.
Start with a model in which the frequency of an allele A changes from p1 to p2 
= wAp1 due to natural selection (where wA is the relative fitness of A). Now Bran-
don and Ramsey claim:
Given this very simple model we can easily add the effects of migration and 
mutation (where µ is the mutation rate from A to a, v is the mutation rate 
from a to A, and m1A is the rate of loss of A due to emigration, m2A the gain 
in A due to immigration, m1a the rate of loss of a due to emigration, and 
m2a the rate of gain of a due to immigration). (2007: 71)
This results in the following addition:
p2 = wAp1 + p1(1 − µ) + (1 − p1) v − m1A + m2A
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q2 = waq1 + q1(1 − v) + (1 − q1) µ − m1a + m2a
Brandon and Ramsey are correct that this kind of simple addition is quite common 
in evolutionary modeling. But this presentation is misleading in several respects.
First, population genetics tracks the relative frequencies of alleles, not their 
absolute frequencies. Hence, after calculating p2 and q2 as above, there is a further 
step of re- normalizing by dividing by p2 + q2. As a result, the contributions will not 
be strictly additive. But additivity per se is not really the issue here. The real issue is 
whether the contributions of selection, migration, and mutation are independent. 
This means, e.g., that the contribution of migration is the same, regardless of the 
extent of the contribution due to selection and mutation, and that the effect of the 
three forces working in combination can be calculated from the contribution of the 
individual forces. This will be true whether the rule for calculating the joint effect 
is “add the individual contributions together,” or whether it is “add the individual 
contributions together and then re- normalize.”
A more serious problem with Brandon and Ramsey’s presentation is that it ob-
scures a sensitivity to both time and frequencies. Matthen and Ariew (2009) raise 
the following objection to Brandon and Ramsey’s example:
Suppose that the rates of mutation, migration, and selection were depen-
dent on one another. Then we couldn’t calculate net change in the simple 
way that these authors suggest. . . . For as migration occurred, the muta-
tion rate would also be changing. To calculate net change, therefore, we 
would need to know how mutation varied as a function of migration, and 
vice versa— and of course we would need the same quantities for selection 
as well. Here too, combined change under selection, migration, and muta-
tion is not a function of change under selection alone, migration alone, and 
mutation alone (219).
There are two different ways to interpret the claim “as migration occurred, the mu-
tation rate would also be changing” and others like it. In Brandon and Ramsey’s 
example, the coefficients µ and v do not represent the absolute rates at which 
parents with allele A produce gametes with allele a, and vice versa, but the pro-
portional rates. That is, µ is the proportion of parents with allele A that produce 
gametes with allele a (and similarly for v). It would be very strange indeed if these 
coefficients were affected by migration or selection. Indeed, the principle that mu-
tations are not directed amounts to the claim that mutation rates are not influ-
enced by selection pressures. Matthen and Ariew are certainly correct that if µ and 
v were influenced by migration, the contributions of the different forces would not 
be additive. But there is absolutely no reason to think that mutation and migration 
rates would be interdependent in this way.
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A more plausible reading of Matthen and Ariew’s claim is that the absolute 
rate of mutation from A to a is dependent upon migration and selection in the fol-
lowing sense: The absolute mutation rate in a given generation depends upon the 
relative frequency of A and a in the parental generation, and this in turn has been 
influenced by the action of selection and migration. This claim is absolutely cor-
rect, and Brandon and Ramsey’s presentation obscures this somewhat. First, they 
present the emigration rates m1A and m1a as constants, but it would be very surpris-
ing if these rates did not depend upon the frequency of A and a in the population. 
Second, Brandon and Ramsey’s model represents events that take place over the 
course of a generation. Let us suppose that p1 and q1 are the frequencies of A and 
a in a population of adult organisms that are about to mate. During meiosis, mu-
tation occurs, and we will have a slightly different distribution of A and a among 
the gametes produced. Now selection occurs and changes the frequencies again. 
To calculate the effect of selection, we have to do our calculation using the post- 
mutation frequencies. Finally, individuals migrate into and out of the population. 
The number of individuals of types A and a who emigrate from the population will 
then be determined by the post- selection frequencies of A and a.
If this is what Matthen and Ariew are claiming, then they are entirely correct. 
How selection for or against an allele A will affect a population depends upon the 
current frequency of A in the population. The frequency of A in the population, in 
turn, has been affected by the past action of mutation and migration. Thus if we 
accumulate the effects of selection, mutation, and migration over many genera-
tions, it will be impossible to disentangle the individual effects of selection, muta-
tion, and migration.
But this is exactly analogous to the situation in Newtonian mechanics. In the 
evolutionary case, the effect of one evolutionary force acting at a given time de-
pends upon the frequencies of various alleles in the population, and this in turn 
depends upon the past action of other evolutionary forces. In Newtonian mechan-
ics, the effect of one component force acting at a given time depends upon the po-
sitions of various bodies, and these, in turn, depend upon the past action of other 
forces. And in both the evolutionary and the Newtonian cases, the total effect of 
multiple forces acting over time (the change in frequency of an allele and the total 
displacement vector) is not simply a sum of what the effects would have been if 
each of the forces had been acting alone.
But perhaps Brandon and Ramsey’s example is uncharitable in another respect. 
Their example involves combining different kinds of evolutionary forces. But per-
haps what Matthen and Ariew really have in mind is that the different factors that 
affect fitness do not combine in anything like the way Newtonian forces do. For 
example, they write:
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[W]e have no way of calculating whether a given sex- selection strategy in-
teracts with a given parental care strategy, and how the fitness produced by 
the variants of these strategies combine. This inability to add the “forces” 
of fitness is even more pronounced when the source laws are in unrelated 
domains. Suppose a certain species [sic]19 undertakes parental care, is re-
sistant to malaria, and is somewhat weak but very quick. How do these fit-
ness factors add up? We have no idea at all. (Matthen and Ariew 2002: 67)
This claim seems correct. And at least some kinds of forces in Newtonian me-
chanics do add up in the way Matthen and Ariew suggest. For example, we can 
calculate the gravitational forces exerted by each part of a massive body, add them 
up, and derive the gravitational force exerted by the body as a whole. But not all 
Newtonian forces work this way. Consider again the case of friction. Suppose that 
we know the coefficient of friction between a wooden block and a wooden plane. 
(See figure 1.) Suppose also that we know how the coefficient of friction would 
change if we were either to cover the block with sandpaper or to coat the slope 
with engine oil. Newtonian mechanics provides us with no simple rule for how to 
combine these to calculate the coefficient of friction that would result if we both 
covered the block with sandpaper and coated the slope with motor oil. Similarly, 
there is no simple rule for combining the various factors that affect the value of a 
spring constant.
Tertium Quid
Matthen and Ariew (2009) argue that a Newtonian force is, while selection is not, 
a tertium quid. By tertium quid they mean a distinct causal variable that occurs 
as an intermediate link in a causal chain. For example, a mosquito bite can cause 
malaria by causing infection with plasmodium, the type of parasite that causes 
malaria. We have a causal chain in which the mosquito bite causes the infection, 
which in turn causes malaria. The plasmodium infection is an intermediate cause 
that is distinct from both the mosquito bite and the disease. They write:
Natural selection is a tertium quid on Sober’s account, [footnote omitted] 
an intervening variable that drives the process [of evolution]. The causal 
diagram in evolution- by- selection would go like this, according to his ac-
count:
19. Species is the wrong category here. If all members of the species are like this, the effect on 
fitness of these traits will be zero. So we assume Matthen and Ariew intended to say that members of 
some type within a population have these traits.
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heritable variation in trait T ՜ selection of magnitude proportionate to 
variance in heritable fitness due to heritable variation in T ՜ birth and 
death of animals ՜ evolution
(Matthen and Ariew 2009: 206)
Matthen and Ariew go on to argue that this is not the proper way to understand 
natural selection. We are certain that Sober would reject this interpretation of his 
position; indeed Shapiro and Sober (2007: 249 ff.) appear to argue that this is not 
the right way to think about what it would be for selection to be a cause. In any 
event, we will simply agree that natural selection is not a tertium quid in this sense.
Matthen and Ariew claim that a Newtonian force, by contrast, is a tertium 
quid. They write:
Newton’s Law of Gravitation  .  .  . governs a certain interaction between 
pairs of massive particles. But most physicists think that this interaction is 
mediated by a tertium quid— the force of gravitational attraction. In other 
words, they hold that
(7)  A massive particle P1 caused another massive particle P2 to move is 
true in virtue of
(8)  The gravitational attraction exerted by P1 caused P2 to move.
Thus, physicists diagnose gravitation in terms of the following causal dia-
gram:
mass of two particles ՜ gravitational attraction of magnitude proportion-
ate to product of masses ՜ motion
(Matthen and Ariew 2009: 208– 209)
The claim is not merely that the gravitational force is logically or conceptually dis-
tinct from the masses of the particles. Nor is it merely that one calculates the effect 
of the masses by calculating the forces. They claim that the masses of the particles 
cause a gravitational force, which in turn causes the motion.
Sober (1984: 50, note 38) explicitly rejects this. He says:
What is the relation of a force to its source? In classical physics, it is a mis-
take to think of a pair of massive objects separated by a given distance as 
causing a gravitational force to come into existence. The theory holds that 
the force comes into existence simultaneously with the appearance of the 
massive objects; so, if causes must precede their effects, we shouldn’t view 
the relation as causal.
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However, Newtonian mechanics is a notoriously non- local theory, so perhaps we 
should not rely on simultaneity to rule out a causal relation between the presence 
of massive objects and the gravitational force.
Matthen and Ariew (2009) suggest that we use Woodward’s manipulability 
test of causation. (They cite Hausman and Woodward 1999, Woodward 2003, and 
Woodward 2008.20) According to Woodward, a relationship between two vari-
ables is causal if it is stable under interventions, and two variables are distinct if it 
is possible to intervene on (or manipulate) them independently. Within this frame-
work, in order for the causal diagram
mass of two particles ՜ gravitational attraction of magnitude proportion-
ate to product of masses ՜ motion
to be correct, the following must be true: (i) we can intervene on the mass of two 
particles and get different gravitational forces; and (ii) we can intervene on the 
gravitational attraction while leaving the masses (and positions) of the particles 
unchanged and get different motions. Matthen and Ariew recognize that the itali-
cized portion of (ii) is what appears to be problematic:
Since the gravitational attraction between two massive particles supervenes 
on their masses [and positions], one might think that one cannot manipu-
late gravitational attraction in the manner proposed. The only way to ma-
nipulate gravitational attraction is to change the masses that are attracting 
one another [or their positions]. (Matthen and Ariew 2009: 210)
Matthen and Ariew then appeal to Woodward’s account to argue that such an 
intervention is possible after all. They cite the following passage from Woodward 
(2008):
Consider . . . the . . . true . . . causal claim . . . 
(G) The gravitational attraction of the moon causes the motion of the tides.
Human beings cannot at present alter the attractive force exerted by the 
moon on the tides (e.g., by altering its orbit).  .  .  . [I]t may well be that 
there is no physically possible process that will meet the conditions for 
an intervention on the moon’s position with respect to the tides  .  .  . For 
example, it may very well be that any possible process that alters the posi-
tion of the moon by altering the position of some other massive object will 
20. Matthen and Ariew appear to cite the version of Woodward’s entry that was originally 
published in 2001, which appeared in editions of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that were 
archived through September 2008. A revised version was published in October 2008.
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have an independent impact on the tides in violation of condition (M2) for 
an intervention. It is nonetheless arguable we have a principled basis in 
Newtonian mechanics and gravitational theory themselves for answering 
questions about what would happen if such a surgical intervention were to 
occur and that this is enough to vindicate the causal claim (G).
The phrase in italics appears in Woodward, but was omitted (with appropriate el-
lipses) when cited by Matthen and Ariew. Matthen and Ariew continue:
Woodward proposes, rightly in our view, that “a properly formulated ver-
sion of a manipulability theory will thus allow us to talk about causal 
relationships in some contexts in which interventions are not physically 
possible” (2008).21
We believe that it is possible to envisage a “surgical intervention” on gravi-
tation itself. . . . [W]e have a principled basis in Newtonian mechanics for 
answering questions about what would happen if we (or God) were to 
surgically intervene on the relationship between mass and gravitational 
attraction. If we made it, for instance, an inverse- cube relation instead of 
an inverse- square relation, or changed the gravitational constant, then we 
would change the gravitational force exerted by the moon without chang-
ing the mass of the moon or of the ocean. (Matthen and Ariew 2009: 211)
In fact, however, Matthen and Ariew have completely misinterpreted Woodward. 
In the passage cited above, Woodward says:
Human beings cannot at present alter the attractive force exerted by the 
moon on the tides (e.g., by altering its orbit). . . . [I]t may well be that there 
is no physically possible process that will meet the conditions for an inter-
vention on the moon’s position with respect to the tides.
This makes it clear that Woodward thinks an intervention on “the attractive force 
exerted by the moon” would just be “altering its orbit” or “an intervention on 
the moon’s position.” These are presented as specific ways of intervening on the 
attractive force (another would be intervening on the moon’s mass). Moreover, 
the impossibility that Woodward is talking about is not the impossibility of, e.g., 
changing the law of universal gravitation, but rather the impossibility of chang-
ing the position of the moon while satisfying the other conditions for being an 
21. Interestingly, this passage does not appear in the revised version of Woodward’s entry first 
published in October 2008.
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intervention. Suppose that some cause I could change the position of the moon. In 
order for I to count as an intervention on the moon’s position with respect to the 
tides, it must meet several conditions, which he labels (M1) to (M4). The second of 
these is that I must not independently affect the tides. It is clear from the italicized 
passage, omitted from the citation in Matthen and Ariew (2009), that the problem 
is that it may be impossible to change the moon’s position in a way that does not 
have a direct effect on the tides (perhaps because of the amount of mass- energy 
required). This is very different from the impossibility of cranking up the strength 
of gravitation or changing the law of gravitation to an inverse- cube law.
So what would Woodward say about the kind of hypothetical changes Mat-
then and Ariew describe? Woodward (2003) describes a similar case:
My focus so far has been on explanations that exhibit patterns of coun-
terfactual dependence having to do with what would happen under in-
terventions.  .  .  . [T]here are derivations that are sometimes regarded as 
explanatory but that exhibit patterns of dependence that are not naturally 
interpretable in this way. For example, . . . the stability of planetary orbits 
depends (mathematically) on the dimensionality of the space- time in which 
they are situated: such orbits are stable in a four- dimensional space- time 
but would be unstable in a five- dimensional space- time. [Footnote omitted] 
Does the dimensionality of space- time explain why the planetary orbits 
are stable? On the one hand, this suggestion fits well with the idea that 
explanations provide answers to what- if- things- had- been- different ques-
tions. . . . [W]e may think of the derivation as telling what would happen 
if space- time were five- dimensional . . . 
One natural way of accommodating these examples is as follows: the com-
mon element in many forms of explanation, both causal and non- causal, is 
that they must answer what- if- things- had- been- different questions. When a 
theory tells us how Y would change under interventions on X, we have . . . a 
causal explanation. When a theory or derivation answers a what- if- things- 
had- been- different question but we cannot interpret this as an answer to a 
question about what would happen under an intervention, we may have a 
noncausal explanation of some sort. This accords with intuition: it seems 
clear that the dependence of stability on dimensionality . . . is not any sort 
of causal dependence. (220– 221)
Woodward’s example about changing the dimensionality of space- time is actually 
very close to Matthen and Ariew’s example about changing the inverse- square law 
to an inverse- cube law. Many phenomena in physics obey an inverse- square law. 
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Consider a brief pulse of sound. As the sound travels outward from its source, 
the energy occupies a spherical shell. The intensity of the sound will be inversely 
proportional to the surface area of the sphere (the energy from the source is now 
spread over the surface of the sphere). Hence we have an inverse- square law. But if 
space had four dimensions, we would expect these phenomena to obey an inverse- 
cube law. So adding a dimension to space- time is very much like changing the 
inverse- square law to an inverse- cube law.
So we can sensibly ask what would happen if gravity obeyed an inverse- cube 
law (it would not be pretty). And this might provide an explanation of some sort. 
But this would not be an intervention on the strength of gravity, and it would not 
tell us about any kind of causal relation.
We conclude that there is nothing in Woodward’s account of causation to sup-
port Matthen and Ariew’s contention that a Newtonian force is a tertium quid.22
6. The Forces Analogy
We conclude that none of Matthen and Ariew’s arguments succeed in showing a 
disanalogy between evolutionary forces and Newtonian forces. In fact, we think 
the analogy is a good one. However, the analogy succeeds, in part, because Newto-
nian forces and evolutionary forces are both heterogeneous. Gravity is very differ-
ent from friction, and natural selection is very different from migration. Thus, to 
say that evolutionary forces are like Newtonian forces tells us comparatively little 
about any particular evolutionary force, such as natural selection. If evolutionary 
forces are like Newtonian forces, that implies that natural selection must be like 
some Newtonian force or other; but it does not imply that natural selection is like 
gravity, or that it is like friction. In fact, our discussion suggests that it is more like 
friction than gravity. We suspect that this is one reason why critics of the dynami-
cal interpretation have mistakenly rejected the forces analogy.
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